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Meeting Link / Recording

Attendees

Attendees

Markus Sabadello 

Stephen Curran 

Drummond Reed 

John Jordan 

Charles Lanahan 

Nuttawut Kongsuwan 

Lance Byrd 

Wenjing Chu 

Rodolfo Miranda 

Samuel Smith This is a future meeting

Agenda Items and Notes (including all relevant links)

TimeAgenda ItemLeadNotes
5 min
  • Start recording
  • Welcome & antitrust notice
  • Introduction of new members
  • Agenda review
Chairs
5 minsReview of action items from previous meetingChairs
5 minsAnnouncementsTF Leads

News or events of interest to members:

  • ToIP has approved the Open Web Foundation (OWF) IPR license
  • This is a provisional
WG/
5 mins

Reports

Open
  • Upcoming milestones
    • IIW Fall 2023
    • There are several potential opportunities, Daniel Hardman will report soon.
  • DIF identifiers discovery "lifecycle of did:web identifiers"
25 minsDiscussionOpen
  • Is a secure did:web spec adoptable, without additional features? Or do we require NEW features like whois, signed files.... if so, can we agree on what else is required?
  • Image Removed
The default should be secure?
  • Verbose solution, Appraisable Security Level API: The spec swells in order to detail multiple 'levels' of security in order to accomodate both familiar and secure mechanisms.
    • Bare JWS provides file integrity, but not authenticity
    • Best-available-data RUN is only acceptable for discovery information, file integrity and monotonically increasing (date)
    • KEL anchors for integrity and authenticity
  • Hybrid solution: You can't publish the JWS without anchoring in a KEL first?
  • Or perhaps, anything not secured by KERI is not did:webs, it is did:web?whois and JWS could be a PR to did:web and the ACDC anchored signature is did:webs
      • Bright line rule: For features that aren't secure, submit them to did:web?
      • Note: discovery information (less security needed, Best-available-data )...
    a level of
      • mitigates replay attack
    information
      • , but can be DDOS attacked.
    Daniel Hardman suggested last week that we explore the 'notion that did:web can borrow the view of did:webs" during our discussion about using JWS vs. ACDC.
    • Markus Sabadello diagramed the different resolver architectures, pros/cons, support for did:web, etc. https://github.com/peacekeeper/did-keri-resolver/
      • Generate a did doc and oobi file so that you can publish them to any web server
      • Then resolver verifies the did doc using the oobi file
      • Who is the verifier? the resolver
        • Does it need an oobi or does it need all of the events (KEL/TEL) like a Watcher does
          • The verification is verifying that the did document is properly formed.
          • Don't need a pool of watchers, But then availability attacks are potentially a problem.
            • Do we rewrite the watcher to handle a file format that doesn't exist. Currently it is stored as a content addressable database, the database can restream the database in case of loss.
            • Watchers stores KELs/TELs
            • To store the KEL in github, you would need to re-verify it each time.
              • The watcher could bootstrap from this file, but that is very expensive.
              • Watcher code is designed to verify on the fly, making caching very important for scale.
                • Verify only the latest events when a KEL is updated
                  • If there is a presentation, etc. you want to asynchronously update. 
          • Use Case. I get a univerisity did
            • I verify the did doc when i get it.
      • Can the resolver cache OOBIs? Yes
    Bright line rule: Should the core of did:webs be the more familiar but less secure options, like JWS? Or should those be extensions to the did:webs spec?
    5 minsAny other businessOpen


    5 mins
    • Review decisions/action items
    • Planning for next meeting 
    Chairs
    •   Lance Byrd Create a PR for the spec that abstracts the verification information to CESR resources/mime type (not files) to support multiple reference implementations. The resolver can use local file(s), OOBIs, Watcher pools, DB/cache, etc for verification as long as it results in secure KEL/TEL verification.