<DAY> March <#>

Attendees

Participants: 

Agenda Items

Document review & discussion


Presentations 

Key Resources:


Recording - Link

Notes

1. Welcome and Linux Foundation antitrust policy - http://www.linuxfoundation.org/antitrust-policy

Is the Trust registry open to the public? There is a comment in the document about verifying the verifier

[Todd]  it's not a public registry and that it's going to be controlled access, let me just do this, let me just do an assignment.

[Steve] There's going to be some sort of concept of centralization around a registry, you know I think the days I mean you mentioned, you can go down the down the road but well that that's that's a long and.

[Steve] You know why respect and is, you know recognized and all that sort of thing right so it's not just you know me and my buddy standing up saying hey important authority, you know that would be somebody with some kind of recognition. And you know with that then comes the notion of you know who can access, both in terms of.

[Todd] But we're sort of in a chicken and egg situation where the governance framework working group is is is kind of taking the approach where they're saying hey we're on hold until we get feedback from the trust registry.

[Steve] yeah and it didn't mean to imply this you know, putting that off to governance.

[Marcos] I wanted to share with you some thoughts on these because we have been having y some discussions around this but also.

[Marcos] I promise I'm gonna try to put together all of this information and I'm going to try to share in suggestion mode in the document so maybe we can discuss and we can review which of these things can be useful.

[Todd] let's stop thinking about trust registries in traditional models and start thinking about them as key resolvers.

[Stephan] How does that become resolving a key?  I'm blocked on that if you have done all the crypto stuff and arrives at verified, everything is okay, 

[Todd] I would I would fetch their did document, and I would make the assumption that either through that DID document or through a mechanism as Marcos described that the signing keys are in there.

[Stephan] Yes, but again Todd you're keys are in there, can I trust that I can authenticate that entity. It doesn't really it doesn't speak to the trust mechanism, we need to establish whether you can trust the issue or if that document iis trusted.

[Todd] Agreed the sequence that you're describing where I would be able to verify the authenticity of a document or a signature without from a verify the issuer is in the trust registry first. - I assume I already had and was determined to be a trusted issuer.

[Steve] The verification people might be part of the airlines, they might be independent, they might be part of the coverage, but they draw lines around those. And you talk about calling these extemporaneous trust things evolving, naturally, but really that evolved out of the context of the problem.

[Todd] The challenge is that there is some of that problem that is out of our control, like with the WHO and and the EU green pass, so you know we do get into the multiple.

[Steve] I think that a lot of that occurs outside of the system. For example, if I have a third party processing, on behalf of the airlines, yes I've expanded my ecosystem, but effectively the contract that an airline has with a third party brings it back in because it's very talking about distributing liability.

[Stephan] We are, we need to prove ourselves to an immigration officer or a TSA officer scanning this thing on your phone.

[Steve] That's exactly what the rules engine is talking about and they have this concept that the rules engine is the big heavy lift stuff ready to get a bunch of credentials I apply bunch of, legal constructs and to come up the answer or creates a pass like a boarding pass them by just be a check mark on existing pass I move through the process.

       

Action Items

  1. TBC